Abstract Near Field Communication (NFC) is an emerging proximity wireless technology used for triggering automatic interactions between mobile devices. In standard NFC usage, one message is sent per device contact, then the devices must be physically separated and brought together again. In this paper, we present a mechanism for automatically sending multiple messages without any need to physically decouple the devices. After an introduction to NFC and related security issues, we discuss the motivation for-and an implementation of-an automation framework for sending repeated NFC messages without any need for human interaction. Then we consider how such an automated mechanism can be used for both a denial of service attack and as a platform for fuzz testing. We present experimental evidence on the efficacy of automated NFC as a vector for achieving these goals. We conclude with suggestions for future work and provide some overall insights.
Introduction
In the past several years, Near Field Communication (NFC) has started to appear on a large number of mobile devices. By the end of 2013, an estimated 1 in 3 new smartphones being were NFC-capable [5] . Proponents of NFC promise an appealing user experience that allows users to easily perform tasks such as file transfers or contactless payments [29] . A broad variety of applications for NFC have appeared over the past decade. Examples of NFC applications include transit system cards such as the Bay Area Clipper card [9] , contactless payments via credit cards such as the Barclay-card [12] , and NFC-enabled advertisements in magazines [11] . The technology has been officially endorsed by technology giant Google [43] , and NFC is the technology behind the Google Wallet payment application.
NFC is not without its detractors, however; some researchers have identified potentially vulnerabilities linked with the technology. For instance, researchers have demonstrated the potential for NFC-based misuse of real-world ticketing systems [25] and attacks against Google Wallet that leverage NFC [34] . Part of the trouble lies in the difficulty of testing NFC implementations prior to release, as discussed in [23] .
In this project, we examine the automation of NFC transactions and then analyze two potential use cases for such automated transactions. First, we consider the potential usage of NFC as an attack vector. More specifically, we consider NFC's potential for performing denial of service (DoS) attacks. Second, we consider the usage of automated NFC messaging for fuzz testing NFC itself.
This paper describes the implementation of a framework that performs automated sending of NFC messages. The resulting framework can be configured to perform either fuzz testing or a DoS attack against another mobile phone. We present an analysis of the impact of our NFC-based denial of service on a mobile phone, considering aspects such as rate of battery exhaustion, reduction in network capacity, and reduction of available storage space on the phone. We will also explore basic fuzz testing using the same framework.
The format of this paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, we present relevant background information and related work, including discussions of NFC, denial of service in mobile devices, and fuzz testing in mobile devices. We also highlight the relationship between denial of service attacks and fuzz testing in NFC. Then in Sect. 3, we present our framework for automating NFC transactions. Next we look at two specific use cases for the automation framework: Sect. 4 considers the use of automation for performing DoS attacks, while Sect. 5 considers automation for fuzz testing. Both of these sections include experimental results as well as discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of our approach. Finally, in Sect. 6, we provide our conclusions and offer suggestions for future work.
Background

Near field communication
Near Field Communication (NFC) is a low power, short range, wireless technology used to trigger automatic transactions between two pieces of NFC-enabled hardware when they come into close proximity. It has a maximum operating range of around 10 cm, although in practice the transmission range is limited to 4 cm or less [17] . Its limited range is due to the fact that it works via induction-every NFC device contains a small induction coil, and when a powered device comes into range of another device, it generates a magnetic field that powers the dormant NFC circuit.
There are two categories of NFC devices relevant to our discussion, namely, mobile devices and tags. NFC mobile devices are generally cellular phones or tablets. Mobile devices can interact with other mobile devices or with passive tags. Tags are inherently passive and similar in nature to RFID tags. Tags cannot participate in peer-to-peer transactions but can be read or written by mobile devices.
In each NFC transaction, one party acts as the target and one as the initiator [13] . The terminology stems from the original NFC mode, with one NFC reader and a passive tag. In that case, the initiator refers to the device, which generates an RF field that powers on the passive tag [18] . The tag is then referred to as the target, and the initiator reads data from it. This vocabulary persists even in peer-to-peer NFC mode, where both devices are independently powered-the initiator is the device that will receive data, and the target is the device that will send data. To minimize confusion, we refer to the initiator as the destination phone and the target as the source phone in this paper.
In most cases, the data transmitted via NFC is fed into an application, triggering some response. One common linkage is between NFC messages containing URI data and a cell phone's web browser. When the mobile phone uses NFC to read a tag containing a URI, the web browser on the phone may be launched and directed to the specified URI. This type of automatic transaction is at the core of NFC's intended usage.
NDEF format
Since NFC originated as a technology for reading and writing passive tags, its message format was developed with tags in mind. There are several record types in existence, but the standard format is called NFC Data Exchange Format, or NDEF. A single passive tag can hold one NDEF message, and a peer-to-peer communication consists of passing one NDEF message, although the communication involves additional control packets as well [28] . The NDEF message is simply a container for one or more NDEF records, as shown in Fig. 1 .
An NDEF record contains one specific piece of data, which often represents a request for a particular action. As previously mentioned, an NDEF can contain an URI, which can be interpreted as a request to open the web browser and load that page. Other things that an NDEF may contain include a file, a phone number, or a Bluetooth pairing record [41] . Figure 2 illustrates an example NFC transaction.
The NDEF record format is detailed extensively in [28] . We summarize the format here in Table 1 .
Related work
NFC security
Many well-known attacks, such as the man-in-the-middle attack, are impractical in NFC due to its extremely short range. A good overview of such general attacks and why they do not work in NFC is available in [17] .
Because many classes ofl attacks are not applicable, NFC security research tends to focus on traits specific to the technology. One interesting issue stems from the fact that NFC is generally used as a pipe to carry a message directly to an application and trigger a response from that application. Thus, if NFC can be used to start and control an application (its intended purpose), then an attacker may be able to use NFC as a channel to exploit any vulnerabilities in that application. One particular application of concern is the web browser. The web browser presents an opening for attacks on a mobile phone, as apparently first considered by Mulliner [25] . Further research in this direction was presented several years later by Miller [23] . Another application researchers have studied intensely is the Google Wallet. In [34] , the authors analyze the communication between the NFC adapter within a mobile phone and the secure element used for the Google Wallet application. Their primary finding is the potential for a software-based relay attack against Google Wallet.
Similarly, the interaction between the NFC service and other services present on mobile phones is a security concern. Kooman and Verdult [41] examined the relationship between NFC and Bluetooth in the Nokia 6212 Classic mobile phone. They showed that NFC can be used to create a Bluetooth connection, which in turn can be used to access and modify memory on the phone remotely.
Another area of interest in NFC security research has been the NDEF message format and related vulnerabilities. Again, Mulliner [25] was one of the first on the scene in this case, performing extensive message fuzzing to identify NDEF messages that would trigger unexpected behavior on the Nokia 6131 cell phone. In a similar vein, Verdult and Kooman [41] explored the NDEF message format. Their work focused on finding inherent flaws with the NDEF format rather than identifying particularly troublesome messages. They identified some grey areas in the NDEF specification that could lead to abuse in Nokia's proprietary NFC implementation. Further attempts to perform and automate NDEF fuzzing [23] also yielded a single bug in NDEF handling on Android that has since been patched by Google.
One threat that has been suggested but has not yet been implemented is use of NFC as an instrument for performing a denial of service (DoS) attack. At least three published papers suggest implementing a DoS attack using NFC [20, 25, 39] . The authors of all three papers envision the attacker mounting the DoS attack using a specialized piece of hardware called a jammer rather than another NFC device. This is a likely due to the dates of publication-in 2009, NFC phones could not yet communicate in peer-to-peer mode and thus did not present threats to one another. However, modern phones have a peer-to-peer NFC communication capability. NFC has also been considered as a vector for performing DoS against the mobile phone's secure element via a replay attack [33] .
Denial of service in mobile devices
Denial of service is any attack that prevents an appropriate usage of any given resource by a user who has access rights to that resource [16] . DoS is a problem in many areas of computing; any time there is a limited resource, there is a potential for a malicious program to monopolize access to that resource.
The relatively resource-limited nature of mobile devices makes them particularly vulnerable targets for denial of service attacks. In a mobile device, virtually all resources are limited, including network capacity, battery power, memory, storage space, and CPU cycles. Mobile devices even have limited resources in terms of display space. Any of these resources could be at the center of a DoS attack against a mobile phone.
The problem of DoS attacks on cell phones has been considered in the literature. Possibly the most frequently discussed vector for denial of service against mobile phones is Bluetooth, another short range wireless technology. Bluetooth differs from NFC in that it has a much longer range and higher data rate [41] . One similarity between the two, however, is that both push phones towards automating certain tasks. Bluetooth is often used to automatically pair mobile phones with peripheral devices. Some research focuses on Bluetooth's potential for tying up network resources via signal jamming [6, 30] . In addition, there has been research into using Bluetooth for battery exhaustion attacks [15] .
Battery exhaustion is a particularly relevant type of DoS attacks in cellular phones. As any routine cell phone user knows, battery life is a limited and precious commodity in a phone. If a battery exhaustion attack occurs, the battery life can diminish rapidly, severely interrupting the usage of the device. The following three general ways of performing battery exhaustion attacks on mobile phones have been considered [22] :
• Attacks that rely on excessive network activity • Attacks that use repeated valid tasks • Attacks that rely on malicious applications
The first method, battery exhaustion via network services, appears to be the most popular in the literature. In [24] , the authors study the impact of battery exhaustion attacks using WiFi and Bluetooth as the attack vectors, and find that the impact can be significantly detrimental. The paper [31] considers an interesting attack using the cellular data connection as the attack vector. The cellular connection is used to quietly send massive numbers of text messages and the constant network activity causes battery exhaustion.
NFC on Android
In recent years, NFC has become strongly associated with Android phones. The first NFC-enabled Android phone, the Nexus S, appeared in late 2010. Since then, more vendors have added support for NFC to their Android phones and Google has continued to expand its development of NFC for Android. In an effort to enable developers to create NFC applications and thus increase demand in the market, Google has provided a set of intuitive APIs for NFC. Most of these NFC-related APIs are contained in the com.android.nfc package, with com.android.nfc.tech also providing APIs specific to passive tag access [47] . Google maintains documentation on the NFC APIs as well as introductory information on programming with them [3] .
Fuzz testing and NFC
Fuzz testing
Fuzz testing (also known as fuzzing) is a type of software security testing. It consists of bombarding a program with input in an attempt to find conditions that will make the software behave unexpectedly. When designing software, programmers tend to focus intently on the positive use cases for their product. The main goal is to design software that can do what the customer wants it to do. Less attention is paid to defensive programming, that is, anticipating bad or unexpected behavior on the part of the user. Fuzz testing lifts some of the burden from programmers by automatically generating well-formed, yet potentially problematic inputs to a system.
There are a wide variety of ways to generate the input used in fuzz testing, and much of the existing research has focused on this issue. Input for fuzz testing falls into two general categories: Generation based input and mutation based input [37] . Generation based input consists of essentially random input that fits a specified format, that is, the format is given, but the content is random. Mutation based input takes a set of inputs, often from a real program run, and morphs them to create new inputs. The input generation program may not even need to know the structure of the data-it just needs to modify it slightly. Both methods have advantages and disadvantages [14, 37] . Generation based input may test a more thorough set of possible inputs, since it could theoretically generate any valid message. However, generation based testing may result in far more tests than needed to find bugs, thus wasting time and resources. Mutation based input is simpler and may be particularly useful in finding user data entry flaws, but it may explore a much smaller input space, potentially missing interesting cases.
Many tools exist for fuzz testing various systems and network protocols. One of the most popular and far reaching tools at present is the Sulley framework [1] . Sulley provides a very flexible input generation system meant to allow for testing a wide variety of protocols. However, Sulley does not provide many options for generating the input and then storing it rather than using it immediately for testing. Another well-known tool for fuzzing is the SPIKE fuzzer creation kit [7] . Unlike Sulley, SPIKE just provides a language for developing fuzz test input. Delivery of the inputs is left to the user.
In both Sulley and SPIKE, the tester defines a block consisting of primitives representing the contents of the message to be sent [1, 7] . Each field is then fuzzed for testing. In both cases, the field may be both mutated or generated based on the settings.
Protocol-specific fuzzing tools exist for various niche wireless technologies such as Bluetooth and RFID [21, 40] . However, there is no existing widely used tool for generating NFC-specific input, although it is possible to use tools such as Sulley and SPIKE to generate appropriate inputs.
NFC-specific fuzzing
In the general case, creating the fuzzing inputs is considered the difficult problem-delivery is usually a simple matter. Consider, for example, the case of sending fuzzing input from a client program connected via WiFi to a server program. Once the work of generating the input is done, testing becomes a simple matter of forming packets and sending them across the link. This task is likely to be trivial to automate.
In NFC, however, the delivery is as complicated as the message generation itself. By design, peer-to-peer NFC is not conducive to easy fuzz testing. The initiator phone queues one record to be sent over NFC. It then connects to the target phone and transmits the single message, at which point it falls idle. To send the next message, the phones must be physically separated and brought back together again. Obviously, this process does not scale well.
Yet, delivery is not the only challenge in fuzzing NFC. Message generation in NFC is very specialized as well, since the message structure is specific to the technology. NFC fuzzing has to take into consideration the various valid formats for NFC (NDEF and its variants) as well as the specific NDEF record types and their valid contents. There are a large number of possible permutations for valid messages for NFC.
Despite the challenges, several efforts have been made at fuzzing on NFC. One approach is to use a separate piece of purpose-specific hardware for performing the NFC transaction. Mulliner [26, 27] appears to have been the first to attempt this kind of fuzzing, using a standalone RFID reader-writer for message delivery and his own Python library for input generation. His work focuses on emulating the interaction between an NFC device and a passive tag rather than two phones. Mulliner has provided a series of Python scripts for generating different types of NDEF records [27] . He uses these scripts to generate a set of fuzz testing inputs, but much of the work has to be done manually.
Miller [23] considers the problem of automating NFC fuzzing using ProxMark3, an RFID device. For this work, the input is generated using a modified version of the Sulley fuzzing framework. Miller's work provides good insight into what to test; for example, he argues that Java exceptions caused by NFC messages can largely be ignored, but that native code crashes are interesting [23] . But again, it relies on a piece of specialized and somewhat expensive hardware.
More recently, Stirparo [36] proposed an NFC fuzzing framework that utilizes the Android emulator within the Android SDK. This work focuses primarily on input generation and suggests an NFC-specific input generation system similar to Mulliner's Python library. Stirparo also proposes a novel way of delivering the fuzz testing input-the NFC messages would actually be events simulated via the Android Debug Bridge (ADB), possibly sent to an emulated device as intents for the NFC subsystem to handle. Emulation provides some advantages in that it eliminates hardware costs and allows for testing a wide range of devices. Also, ADB is conducive to easy logging and monitoring. However, there are limitations to fuzz testing with the Android emulator, since any emulator may mask certain problems such as synchronization or timing quirks, of which NFC has manyseveral such issues are mentioned in Sect. 4.
Wiedermann [44] presents interesting and recent work on fuzz testing NFC. In Wiedermann's design, the tests are generated using the Sulley framework (as in Miller's work), but delivered to the phone via the Robotium tool [32] . One advantage of Wiedermann's design is that it requires little knowledge on the part of the tester. It also does not require specialized hardware, as the test runs between phones. The source phone must be attached to a computer running the Eclipse SDK, however, which limits the solution somewhat.
Relationship between DoS and fuzz testing
Recall that the aim of a denial of service attack is to prevent access to a resource by a legitimate user or the resource [16] . One obvious way to accomplish a DoS is to consume the resource before the intended user can access it. When the limited resource is something that can be affected by network traffic, then an attack method is to flood the network with packets. Thus, a practical implementation of a flooding attack involves sending multiple messages, likely without any significant pauses and certainly without any physical effort on the part of the attacker. Now consider the act of fuzz testing. Fuzz testing consists of sending input to a system to reveal unexpected behavior. Occasionally, manual fuzz testing may be practical. But if a system allows for any sizeable set of possible inputs, manually testing them is infeasible. Instead, we want to generate a set of test inputs and then systematically send them to the system one by one, without any significant pause and without any physical effort on the part of the tester.
On the surface, DoS and fuzz testing may seem very different. However, in the context of NFC, they both rely on the same basic process, namely, automated message sending. Thus a message automation mechanism such as the one proposed in this paper enables both fuzz testing and DoS. As often happens in security, the same underlying technique can be used for "good" or "evil." Figure 3 summarizes some of the key points of DoS and fuzz testing in NFC in the form of a venn diagram.
Automating NFC messaging
This section describes an ideal automation framework for NFC, where multiple messages can be sent without any need for human interaction. After presenting the ideal application, we then discuss our specific application.
An ideal automated NFC application
In an ideal automated NFC messaging application, the user should be able to specify inputs to the application. These inputs will form the contents of the NFC messages sent during communication. Relevant types of inputs to the application include a user-provided set of NFC messages, a randomly generated set of NFC messages, or a single hard-coded NFC message. The first type of input would work well for generation-based fuzz testing, while the second type would be sufficient for performing a flooding-based DoS attack, and the third type would be useful for mutation-based fuzz testing.
Once the input is provided, there should be a mechanism for beginning the automated message sending. Once the mechanism is triggered, the provided messages should be sent, one by one, until some completion condition is met. Possible completion conditions include the end of a specified test duration (for timed test), the end of the input file (for fuzz testing with a specific set of inputs), or the appearance of a failure condition such as the NFC subsystem crashing (for DoS attacks).
It is critical that once the automated sending begins, there need not be any further human interaction with the device. That is, the attack or test should continue until it hits a completion condition. It should not be necessary to move the phones around, press any buttons, or manually interact with the devices in any other way.
Ideally, the automated sending application would record relevant statistics for the attack or test. Examples of such statistics include the duration of the test, the reason the test stopped, the number of messages sent, and details on the content of the messages sent. The duration of the test and the reason for completion give an insight into whether or not the run was successful. The number of messages sent may be useful for determining the minimum necessary for an attack, or as a confirmation that an entire data set was used for fuzz testing. The content source details would provide a reminder of the nature of the application run.
As an aside, it would be extremely useful to have statistics gathered on the destination side as well. Particularly in terms of fuzz testing, the results on the recipient's end may provide useful insight into what is happening. In our system design, we assume that the relevant messages will be captured by the Android logging system and available via the logcat tool [4] . Some tools such as Sulley provide reporting on the target device, but we consider this outside the scope of our research.
Finally, any automated NFC messaging application should have at least a minimal ability to perform self-recovery. NFC has intermittent failures even in typical usage. A single error such as a debounce should not cause the entire system to grind to a halt. NFC is also prone to timing and synchronization issues, and these should not stop the application either.
Automated NFC application design
Our application is designed to run on an Android phone. It was specifically tested on a Galaxy Nexus HSPA+/GSM phone. The design includes two key parts: A modified build of the Android Open Source Platform (AOSP) operating system, and an Android application for configuring and launching the automated message sending. A third important practicality is that the source phone must be rooted. Section 3.4 covers the necessity of a modified build of the AOSP, while rooting of the source phone is covered in Sect. 3.4.4. But first we discuss the application in detail.
The application
The application was designed with the considerations outlined in Sect. 3.1. It consists of a simple UI that will meet the needs of both the fuzz testing and denial of service use cases, and a backend that performs the actual work. Figure 4 shows the visual layout of the user interface. It can be subdivided into two separate panes: The content configuration pane and the test length configuration pane. Henceforth, "test" is used to refer to an execution of the message sending application, regardless of whether it is a fuzz test or a denial of service attack.
Interface design
The content configuration pane allows for the selection of the content source. The options are summarized in Table 2 . Note that the selection of the content source determines whose responsibility it is to generate the message content. For options 1 and 3, the content is assumed to be generated by the user. For option 2, the content is generated by the application. Section 5.4 discusses the method applied to generate random content for this research.
The test length pane allows for the selection of the completion condition for the test. The options are summarized in Table 3 . While the options are straightforward, it is worth mentioning the behavior in case there is a mismatch between the specified length and the content source. That is, what happens when the application runs out of input messages before the completion condition for the test is met? When this happens, the solution is simple-we return to the beginning of the content source and reuse the messages that were already sent.
The third option, run until failure, requires a little more explanation than the other two. There are cases in which it is desirable to continue testing until an unrecoverable failure occurs. An unrecoverable failure in this context means something that irrevocably breaks the connection between the source device and target device. In practice, the two events that tend to constitute unrecoverable failures are NFC subsystem crashes and phone shutdown due to a drained battery. NFC subsystem crashes occur frequently, but are often recoverable, indeed, the NFC service will attempt to automatically recover from subsystem crashes. Yet occasionally the subsystem will deadlock and crash somewhat dramatically. When this happens, NFC is completely unavailable until the phone has been restarted. Unfortunately, this can happen on either the source phone or the target phone, often during seemingly typical use. Phone shutdown due to battery drain can happen to either party as well. Battery drain is often a goal in a denial of service attack.
Along with the two primary panes, there is also a button for starting and stopping the test. When clicked from the stopped state, the application does some basic checking to make sure Remote File Messages are stored in a remote text file; the user will provide the URL in the provided field User-generated
Random File Messages will be randomly generated using an NDEF fuzzing library App-generated
Fixed URI
The same message will be sent repeatedly; the user will specify a URI to be used as the message contents
User-generated The reason for the test ending (i.e., user interaction) is also logged. In the event that the test completion condition is met without anyone manually clicking the stop button, the button will be automatically reverted to the off (click to start) state. Note that during the execution of a test, the interface becomes non-functional aside from the stop button. This is to limit unexpected interactions between the UI elements and the Android event system during the execution of the test. When execution finishes, the UI elements become available once more.
Backend
Now let us turn our attention to the backend of the application, where the actual work is done. In Sect. 3.4 we describe some of the work that needs to be done for the backend to achieve functionality discussed here-for now, just assume that the functionality discussed here can be achieved.
The idea behind the backend implementation is simple, although implementation is not entirely straightforward. The approach is this: After an NDEF message is sent, the next NDEF is queued for sending and the NFC adapter is programmatically reset the same way that it is reset when the phones are physically separated and brought back together. This action is repeated over and over again until the test completion condition is met.
After an NDEF is sent, the next NDEF is pulled from the content source. (In the case of a fixed message, the same NDEF is used over and over again.) Once the value is pulled from the input file, it is fed into our custom createNdefmessage function, which returns a new NDEF for sending. After the new NDEF is created, it is queued for sending using the setNdefPushMessage function (discussed in Sect. 3.3.2). Only one NDEF may be queued at a time.
The key to repeatedly performing NFC transactions is to re-enter a state of discovery. Discovery is NFC parlance for the state in which one device is actively seeking out (i.e., attempting to discover) other tags or devices. In standard usage, a device re-enters discovery mode after it is found to be out of range of a device it had been communicating with. Our backend forces the phone into rediscovery by utilizing an API provided by the NfcAdapter class called setP2pModes (discussed further in Sect. 3.3.2). This is not a public API and must be revealed via reflection (see Sect. 3.4.5).
One quirk of the NFC subsystem is that it is very sensitive to timing. If the source device is forced into rediscovery at an inopportune moment, it is possible that it will miss its chance to become the target and instead become the initiator. Since the destination device is essentially unaware of the presence of the source device (it is simply receiving and never intending to send), this can cause the entire test case to hang and eventually fail. The solution is to periodically force rediscovery, regardless of the state that the device is in. That is to say, force the discovery cycle to begin again even if the device is already in discovery. Experimentally, 15 s is an adequate timeout for resetting rediscovery; almost all non-file NDEFs will have transferred in that time, so if rediscovery has not occurred, it is most likely due to a hang. Section 3.4.7 discusses the implementation details of this hard reset further.
Basic NFC Functions:
In this section, we review four NFC functions implemented and used by the backend. Table 4 provides a summary of the functions discussed. Two of the four functions must be implemented by any Android application that wants to use NFC: onNdefPushComplete and createNdefMessage. The onNdefPushComplete function gives the programmer an opportunity to enter a function that will occur directly after an NDEF is successfully sent (i.e., pushed) by the application. In our case, onNdefPushComplete is responsible for fetching the next input, using it to generate an NDEF, and calling the rediscovery function.
The next relevant function is createNdefMessage. In our implementation, the behavior of createNdefMessage is thus: The next line of input has already been successfully retrieved If the string does not start with uri:, then the input line is assumed to be an NDEF message expressed as raw bytes. The bytes are fed directly into a constructor provided by the NdefMessage class. We rely on the validity of the byte array in the line; if an invalid input has been provided, an exception may be raised. (See Sect. 5.4 for more information on how the input strings are built.)
The function setOnNdefPushCompleteCallback simply marks a callback for the program. Since NFC is asynchronous, it must know where to return to after an NDEF push completes. Registering the callback by calling this function marks such a spot.
Finally, we consider setNdefPushMessage. This API has fallen out of favor due to the fact that it assumes static content, that is, the device will send out the same message to any other device it meets. A more modern API is setNdefPushMessageCallback, which allows the NDEF message to be edited on-the-fly depending on the encountered device. For instance, perhaps a plaintext message that simply said "hello" might be modified to say "hello Hal" if the device encounters a device named Hal. As we do not need this sort of dynamic functionality for performing either input testing or denial of service, we have opted to use the older, simpler API.
NFC discovery and rediscovery:
As previously mentioned, one of the core mechanisms in the application backend is the NFC discovery loop. Discovery is the state in which the NFC device is actively scanning for the presence of other devices or tags. Discovery is controlled by the hardware abstraction layer (HAL), which iterates through a discovery wheel containing the possible transaction modes for the device. The cycling happens so quickly as to appear instantaneous although, in fact, it sometimes results in timing issues. The possible roles for a device are active target, active initiator, passive target, and passive initiator [18] . The two active roles refer to NFCIP communication, where both devices generate their own RF fields. In passive mode, the initiator generates an RF field and the target modulates that field. Passive mode is meant for interactions between a device and either a tag or a device in card emulation mode. For our application, we want the source phone to be an active target and thus it must encounter another phone acting as an active initiator (that is, scanning for other devices to read from).
To get into discovery mode, we rely on an API of the NfcAdapter class called setP2pModes. The function setP2pModes takes two arguments, initiatorModes and targetModes. These arguments specify whether or not the adapter is to play that particular role. In typical use, one of the arguments is 0 and the other is 1, that is, the adapter seeks one particular role and not the other. This seems to determine which opportunity will be sought first on rediscovery. Since we want our application to be the target, we pass in initiatorModes = 0 and targetModes = 1. The API of the NfcAdapter class interfaces with a function in the class NfcService (which is not directly accessible by an application). The NfcService class contains a setP2pModes function as well. This function interacts with a deviceHost object representing the phone. It sets the phone's initiator and target modes per the provided parameters, then disables NFC discovery on the phone, then re-enables discovery on the phone.
So assuming we can access the public class NfcAdapter, we can call the setP2pModes function, which will do exactly what we want, namely, make the phone appear to have left the presence of the other device (disabling discovery) and re-entered it (enabling discovery).
Obstacles preventing automation
A surprising number of obstacles must be overcome to successfully automate NFC message sending. The road to being This permission allows an application to modify the NFC adapter's state. However, only system applications may gain this permission. So we must convince Android that our application is a system application. To do so, we must install the application in a special directory (see Sect. 3.4.3). To do that, we need to have permission to write in the Android file system-which is by default read-only. To make it not readonly, we need to root the phone and gain super user access (see Sect. 3.4.4 for details). Once we have completed all of these steps, we must gain access to the setP2pModes function, which is a hidden API. The easiest way to do this is by using reflection, as discussed in Sect. 3.4.5.
At this point, only one obstacle remains. We cannot send some NDEFs without user input due to Android's Touch to Beam interface. So we modify the Android source to disable this feature; see Sect. 3.4.6. The system should now work, but in practice we encounter timing mismatches. We deal with these occasional mismatches and attendant system hang by periodically forcing rediscovery, even when we have not successfully sent a message; see Sect. 3.4.7. Table 5 summarizes the permissions required by our application. All of these permissions can be requested via the application manifest. However, not all of them will necessarily be granted. The trickiest permission is WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS, which allows the application to modify many sensitive objects on the phone, including the NFC adapter.
Getting permissions
As mentioned in Sect. 3.3.2, our scheme relies on being able to force the phone into discovery mode programmatically. To accomplish this, we must be able to change the adapter's state. However, this is disallowed in Android for fairly obvious reasons-if we can change the NFC adapter's state directly, then we can turn on the adapter without the user's knowledge. In doing so, the user may unknowingly be put at risk. 2 Because of this, the most critical permission for our application, WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS, is granted only to system application and is not intended to be available to third party apps such as ours.
The first roadblock with acquiring this permission is easy to bypass. The Eclipse SDK will, by default, disallow inclusion of this permission in the application's manifest. A fatal error will be thrown and the application will be shown in error. To remedy this, we simply needs to change the lint preferences in the Eclipse IDE; details are provided in the next section.
The next roadblock, installing the application as a system app so that it can actually gain the permission, requires more work. This is discussed in Sects. 3.4.3 and 3.4.4.
Pacifying the SDK
To convince Eclipse to allow the application to request the required permissions, we had to disable the Lint warning concerning system application permissions. To accomplish this, we can select Project → Properties → Android Lint Properties from the Eclipse menu. The option ProtectedPermission should be selected and disabled. Figure 5 shows a screenshot of this process.
The steps discussed so far are summarized in Table 6 .
Installing as a system application
Ordinarily, third party applications in Android are installed to the directory /data/app. Applications in this directory have limited permissions within the system. Operating system applications-those written by Google and nec- Gain access to p2pModes via reflection Application essary for the functioning of the phone-are installed in /system/app and given special privileges.
Elevating an application to "system application" status is merely a matter of installing the application in the correct directory. Naturally, this is not a straightforward task. By default, /system/app is read-only. Applications cannot be copied to the directory either via the shell or by using Android Debug Bridge (ADB) push. The way to get around this is to remount the file system at /system as read-write rather than read-only. The overall process is to push the application to the SD card, remount the file system, move the application from the SD card to /system/app, assign its permissions, remount the file system as read-only again and reboot the phone (which will trigger installation). Figure 6 gives the exact commands used for this process.
But, there is a catch: The filesystem cannot be remounted unless the user has superuser privilege. That is, the normal user in the ADB shell cannot use mount. To gain superuser access, the phone must be rooted as discussed in the next section.
Unlocking and rooting the phone
Unlocking and rooting an Android phone are two closely related concepts. Unlocking refers to gaining full access to the bootloader. This enables us replace the stock installation of the Android operating system on a phone with a custom version of the operating system (often referred to as a custom ROM) [42] . This will be required to disable the Touch to Beam UI as discussed in Sect. 3.4.6. Unlocking can be done through the fastboot tool or via an unlocking/rooting package.
Rooting is an additional step beyond unlocking. Android is built largely as a Linux distribution and, as such, many sensitive system tasks are restricted to users with root permissions. But unlike the average Linux distribution, stock Android does not provide any mechanism for assigning the owner of the phone root privileges. The exact process for rooting varies depending on the phone being rooted. The easiest way to root an Android phone is to find a tool for the desired phone and use it. For this research, the WugFresh Nexus Root Toolkit v1.8.2 was used to unlock and root the Fig. 6 Installing the application as a system application phone [45] , as well as to perform periodic backups. The full report [8] discusses this tool and our usage of it in detail.
Using reflection to access setP2pModes
At this point, our application has the correct permissions to modify the NFC adapter state. Yet it still cannot get to setP2pModes directly, because setP2pModes is a hidden API. One way to get around this is to use reflection to gain access to the API. Reflection is a Java programming technique that allows for inspection of the metadata that exists for all classes at runtime [35] . This metadata includes a great deal of very useful information, such as the names of all the functions and members of a class. If a class has private members, those are listed as well. If we know (or can guess) the name of a member or a function, built-in Java reflection functions can be used to search the loaded classes for that member or function. After a desired function is found, it can be set as accessible.
By reading the Android source code, we were able to pinpoint the relevant class (NfcAdapter) and the desired API (setP2pModes) as well as the relevant parameters for the function (the aforementioned initiatorModes and targetModes). During runtime, our application calls a function that causes the classes of NfcAdapter to be enumerated. This list is examined to locate setP2pModes and a handle is retrieved for that function. After that, we are able to use the handle to call the function.
Disabling the touch to beam interface
The Touch to Beam UI is a recent addition to the Android platform. Touch to Beam specifically affects NDEFs carrying files, as the files will be transferred using the Android Beam API. The way it works is that the user queues up (with the help of an application) an NDEF containing a file to send to another phone. When the phones come in contact, a message appears on the sender's phone requesting that he tap the screen to continue the transaction. Unless the screen is tapped, the queued NDEF will not be sent and the transaction will simply hang, waiting for user input or for the phones to move out of range. Figure 7 shows the UI.
The Touch to Beam UI presents a problem if we want to automate sending multiple NDEFs containing files, since our goal is to eliminate human interaction with the phone and Touch to Beam requires a tap per message. The fix for this is to simply disable the UI in the Android source and rebuild it, then flash the phone with our (very slightly) custom ROM. 3 To disable the Touch to Beam UI, the Android source must be very slightly modified. The source contains a class called P2pLinkManager. This class provides high level management of the link state for peer-to-peer NFC transactions. In NFC, Logical Link Control Protocol (LLCP) is the layer-2 protocol. The P2pLinkManager monitors the state of LLCP and performs certain actions based on what is occurring at layer 2. When a new LLCP connection is activated, P2pLinkManager checks to see if the flag FLAG_NDEF_PUSH_NO_CONFIRM is set. This flag gets set for NDEFs containing files such as those pushed over Android Beam. When the flag is set, the function onP2pSendConfirmationRequested is called, which triggers the appearance of the Touch to Beam UI. We circumvent this by removing the call to onP2pSendConfirmationRequested, regardless of the status of the flag. Thus the behavior for a non-Beam NDEF is triggered instead.
Note that only the source phone needs to be flashed with the custom ROM, not the destination phone. Of course, in a denial of service attack, we want to be able to assume that the target phone is stock Android. And even for the purposes of fuzz testing, a changes to the NFC stack may change the phone's behavior so it is best not to use a custom ROM. As a result, the destination phone may in fact see the touch to beam UI message appear at certain times. This has no effect on our sending application and, assume that no human is active on the receiving end during a DoS attack, no effect on the receiving side either.
Periodically resetting NFC
The NFC subsystem is complicated and relies on many asynchronous tasks happening at once. Consequently, it sometimes suffers from synchronization and timing problems. Unfortunately, these can cause our automation application to hang. A solution to this problem is to set a timer and periodically restart NFC. We implement this using Java's built in Timer and TimerTask classes. The TimerTask class specifies a function that should occur when a timer goes off and Timer, which represents the timer itself, has a method called scheduleAtFixedRate. The method ScheduleAtFixedRate fires the associated TimerTask at regular intervals. In our case, TimerTask checks how long it has been since the last NDEF was queued. If it has been longer than a preset threshold, discovery is disabled and enabled again without changing the NDEF contents. It is extremely likely that the phones will synchronize correctly on the second try, and the automation will resume as before. 4 
Logging
One final topic that is relevant to both use cases of our automation application is the logging mechanism. Whether automation is used for fuzz testing or a DoS attack, it is useful to gather statistics about the program execution for later examination. In fuzz testing, the use is practical and ongoing: We want to know if anything unexpected happens on the source phone during the testing, and we want to be able to correlate what is happening on the source phone with what happens on the destination phone. In an actual DoS attack, logging may not be required. However, in the development of a DoS attack, logging is essential to help us judge the impact of the attack. The logging mechanism used by the application is extremely simple. The first time the automation application runs, it creates a directory tited nfc_automation_logs on the phone's SD card for storing the logs. The SD card is a particularly convenient place to store logs because data stored on the SD card is accessible externally. The /sdcard directory contents are accessible using tools such as ADB, via Windows Explorer, or even from other applications. Thus it is easy and convenient to retrieve the logs stored on the SD card.
When a test is started, the application opens a file in this directory, with a file name consisting of the word log with the current time (in milliseconds) appended. This naming scheme ensures that the file names will not be repeated.
At the start of the test, the current time is recorded along with the test configuration parameters (i.e., content source and test length). Statistics are updated throughout the test. At the end of the test run, the gathered statistics are appended to the file along with a final timestamp and the file is closed. The values are written to the file in CSV format to make for easy parsing by other scripts. Table 7 lists the values logged for any run of the application.
Using automation for a DoS attack
In this section, we consider the use of the automation application described in Sect. 3 for mounting a flooding-based denial of service attack via NFC. The basic idea behind the attack is to continually send requests to the destination phone until it reaches a failure state. Possible failure states include complete battery drain or complete disk usage. In the former case, the attack would be classified as a battery exhaustion attack, while in the latter case the attack would be considered a storage consumption attack.
Devices
For the tests presented here, both phones are Galaxy Nexus GSM/HSPA+ phones with Android JellyBean 4.3 installed.
One phone, previously referred to as the source phone, is the attacker. The other, previously referred to as the destination phone, is the victim.
The victim phone is considered to be innocent with regard to the attack. It is running stock Android with no modifications to the source code. In particular, the victim phone does not need to be unlocked or rooted for the attack to work. In addition, the victim does not need to have any special applications installed for handling NDEF messages, although the attack will continue even if the victim has custom NFC applications installed. In the absence of any non-standard applications for handling NDEF messages, the victim phone will resort to Android's default handling of received NDEFs. The victim is just the unfortunate recipient of the attacker's messages, and no human interaction with the victim phone is necessary to start or continue the attack.
The attacker instigates the attack and is responsible for sending all the messages. The attacker must be modified in the ways described in Sect. 3 to allow the automation application to run. That is, the attacker phone has been unlocked, rooted, flashed with a custom ROM that removes the Touch to Beam API (allowing for the collection of debug information), and it has the automation application installed as a system application. The attacker phone is assumed to be manned at least initially, that is, a human must launch the attack.
Interactions
To launch the attack, the attacker uses the automation application. The attacker selects any content option and the test length option "run until failure" and then presses the start button (recall that the UI is illustrated in Fig. 4 in Sect. 3). Note that the attack will not begin until the victim phone comes into range, nor will it start before the start button is pressed. So a real-world attacker could have the attack ready ahead of time, then simply bring the attacker phone into range of the victim phone at the chosen time.
Once the attack has been launched, it will continue until a failure condition is met. Ideally, the failure is on the part of the victim phone, and consists of the victim phone running out of battery life, running out of storage space, experiencing a catastrophic crash of the NFC subsystem (at which point NFC is disabled until the phone is restarted), or meeting with some other unfortunate end. However, if the NFC subsystem has a hard crash on the attacker phone, that also counts as a failure condition and the attack will necessarily stop. The final possible failure condition is a timeout-if it has been more than 10 min since an NDEF was last sent successfully, the automation application will cancel the test.
The attack is expected to have a significant impact on battery life, particularly when WiFi handoff occurs. If the victim phone receives a file, either through a URI of a type that the Android browser immediately downloads or via an NDEF containing a file, the attack will also have an impact on available storage space. It is also possible that if the same URI is sent to the victim over and over again, the victim phone could be flagged for abuse since, to a web server, the victim would seem to be the one performing a flooding attack.
We provide empirical results detailing the impact on battery life and storage space in Sect. 4.5. But first, we discuss attack assumptions and scenarios.
Attack assumptions
The denial of service attack will work against stock Android Jellybean 4.3 with a few caveats. First, the victim's screen must be unlocked and on. This is not an insurmountable barrier; Miller [23] has shown that it is possible to auto-unlock the screen of an Android phone given the victim's phone number. In addition, the victim's screen must stay on for the duration of the attack; if problematic, this could be achieved by repeatedly using Miller's phone number exploit. Also, some NDEF record types may cause the screen to acquire a wakelock, but this depends on the configuration of the victim device. If the application that is registered to handle a record type acquires a wakelock, then sending the message will keep the screen on. Android's default NDEF handling does not seem to do this, however. So in practice, we achieve the screen conditions by installing a free application, Keep Screen On Free, to keep the victim phone's screen turned on throughout the attack [19] .
The victim's phone must stay in range of the attacker's phone for the attack to proceed. However, note that the attack does not automatically fail if the victim phone leaves proximity. It will timeout if no NDEF has been successfully sent in the past 10 min. In the meantime, the attacker phone will still advertise itself, and if the victim phone returns to proximity, the attack will seamlessly resume.
Obviously, both phones are assumed to be NFC capable. The NFC adapter must be enabled on the victim phone for the attack to work. At this time, the automation application is not able to force the victim to enable his adapter.
Although the attack was tested on Galaxy Nexus phones, it should work on any other phones running Jellybean. However, no tests on other phones have been conducted.
How close is close enough?
It is worth taking a moment to discuss what "proximity" means in the context of our attack. In the literature, various numbers appear for the acceptable range for NFC transmissions. Up to 4 cm is a commonly repeated guideline, yet this did not seem to align with our results during experimentation. A simple experiment was performed to measure the actual range of operation between the two phones we used. The automation program was started in attack mode Figure 8 gives the results of this experiment. Our results indicate that in typical usage, the successful transmission range is roughly 3.5 cm, slightly less than the commonly touted number, and nowhere near the theoretical maximum of 10 cm.
Attack implementation
The scenarios considered here focus on monitoring the battery drain and storage consumption associated with a DoS attack over NFC. For these experiments, we focused on sending NDEFs containing fixed URIs. The reason for selecting fixed URIs is a matter of trying to maximize power consumption by the attack. By default, when an NDEF containing a URI is received on Android, the URI is opened in a web browser. This means that the NFC connection triggers a WiFi connection to fetch the URI. Other than of the phone display (which is assumed to be on throughout the attack), WiFi is known to be one of the greatest power drains on most mobile devices, so it is a good choice for an attack designed to drain battery life [10] .
The following three scenarios were analyzed.
Idle phone versus phone under attack
In this first simple scenario, we monitor the phone while idle for 5 min intervals. During this time, the victim phone runs only the Keep Screen On application, Power Tutor, and our victim monitoring application. Battery statistics are collected. We then compare these results to 5 min intervals with the phone actively under attack. In this scenario, the attack consists of sending links pointing to a 50 kb .apk file. The impact on the victim phone's battery was measured in several ways. For a coarse grain view of the battery drain from the denial of service attack, we used a small custom application that runs on the victim phone. The application writes a log file to the SD card on the victim phone. Every 30 s, this log is updated with a current timestamp and the current battery level. The battery level is retrieved using the Android BatteryManager class and its APIs. For a more in-depth view of how the attack is impacting the battery, we use the application PowerTutor 1.4 [46] . PowerTutor also runs as an application on the victim phone and measures the overall power consumption of the system over some user-specified interval. It also shows the power consumption percentage of various applications over the interval as well as the power consumption percentages for various system components (CPU, WiFi, Display, etc.).
Varying file size
In this scenario, we consider the impact of sending NDEF messages containing URI records pointing to .apk files (which are automatically downloaded by the Android browser) of varying sizes. We tested file sizes of 50 kb, 500 kb, and 5 MB. The idea behind this scenario is that if larger files can be downloaded during an interval of time, the storage space will be consumed faster. We also looked at how varying the file size impacted the battery drain. The results for this scenario reported below are based on 10 experiments for each file size. 
Varying test length
In this scenario, we tested a fixed URI as in scenario 1, but used a variable length fixed timed test. This allowed us to ascertain whether or not the power drain from NFC was consistent over time. The intent was to be able to suggested an achievable per-minute battery drain as a result of this type of attack over NFC. We tested intervals of 10, 20, and 30 min, and again monitored with our victim monitoring application and PowerTutor. The results for this scenario reported below are based on 5 experiments for each test length.
Results
In Fig. 9 , we present our results for the first scenario. Figure 9a shows the kernel densities of the amount of energy drained from the battery over the course of the experiment. The results for the idle phone are very consistent-in almost all cases the phones lost 3 % battery life over the course of 10 min. This may sound high at first, but in this scenario, we kept the phone's screen on, and the screen is the largest power drain on the phone. So, although the phone is almost entirely idle, it still loses a significant amount of battery life. The kernel densities for the phone under attack look similar in shape but are centered around 6 % with a larger spread than the idle phone. Figure 9b shows the average for both scenarios. The active attack drains the battery at nearly twice the rate as in the idle scenario. The mean battery drain in the idle scenario is 2.8 % over the course of 10 min, while the mean battery drain in the attack scenario is 4.8 % over the course of 10 min.
From this initial number, we can extrapolate that in this attack scenario it would take approximately 3.5 h on average to drain a full battery. Initial experiments indicate that this number is accurate. However, fully draining the battery without encountering an additional problem on the victim phone is uncommon; see [8] for details on some of the many problems that can appear on the victim phone as a result of our attack. It is also worth noting that the fact that we would not expect to encounter fully charged cell phones in practice-a number closer to half charged is likely more typical. Figure 10 shows the effect of varying the size of the file linked in the NDEF impacts on the victim phone's battery. Each subgraph shows the kernel densities for the battery drain for that file size. For all three file sizes, the kernel densities peaked at 6 %. Performing t-tests on the raw data indicated that there is no statistically significant difference between the three groups in terms of battery consumption. Thus, if battery exhaustion is the only aim of the attack, there is no advantage to using larger file sizes. Figures 11, 12 , and 13 show the storage consumption recorded across ten trials for each file size. Figures 14, 15  and 16 show the average values across all 10 trials for each file size group, which makes the overall trend clear.
Varying file size
All three file sizes follow a similar pattern. We can see that the available space begins to decrease at the beginning of the attack, then increases temporarily before resuming its downward trend. The jump upwards has to do with the Android browser cache, which is cleared once it hits a certain size. Overall we can see a downward trend across all three groups, with the largest removal of free space coming from the file size of 5 Mb. However, we also see that the 5 Mb test case is by far the least consistent.
During the course of the experiments, we found that the 5 Mb file size lead to many problems on the victim phone. In the course of one 10 min experiment, it was not uncommon for the Android browser to crash multiple times, for the NFC subsystem to crash, or for the phone to simply shut down. The report [8] discusses these issues in some detail.
One additional aspect we considered in the file size experiments was the number of NDEFs sent by the attacker. Figure 18 shows the phone's network usage after one single 10 min test, with the file size equal to 5MB. Figure 19 shows results for the battery drain for various test lengths. As expected, we see that the battery drain increases One interesting impact of running longer test lengths is the effect of a longer test on the battery temperature. Figure 20 shows the temperature of the victim phone's battery prior to and immediately following a 30 min attack. With longer attacks, the battery will reach extremely high temperatures as shown in this example. This might conceivably lead to a negative impact on the phone's hardware due to the attack. 
Varying test length
Discussion
We found that the automation system worked as a platform for launching a denial of service attack via NFC, with some limitations. The length of time necessary to perform a battery exhaustion attack via NFC is significant. On the other hand, it is unlikely that most users have fully charged batteries. At a rate of 0.48 % of battery drain per minute, the attack may still pose a threat to phones.
The storage consumption attack is likely the greater threat. We have shown that NFC can be used to initiate a massive number of file transfers over a relatively short period of time, and that the transfers are not limited by size. Once the downloads have been started, they will continue until they are finished and cannot be cancelled by the user, barring an extreme action such as a factory reset. This attack exploits the default behavior of the Android operating system with regards to handling NDEF records with the URI type containing links to certain file types such as .apk. Given sufficient time, this attack can be used to consume the entirety of the 13G of internal storage on our tested Galaxy Nexus phone. Again, it is uncommon that the average cell phone customer would have a completely empty drive at the time of an encounter with an attacker. This attack could devastate a phone with limited free space in a matter of minutes.
There are some potentially interesting ways to expand the attacks presented herein. Part of the impact of the storage consumption attack is the inconvenience it presents for the phone user. In the best case scenario, the user notices the attack and is able to move the phone out of range when only a few hundred file downloads have started. After the fact, the user must delete the downloaded files. In its present implementation, this is easy-since a fixed URI is used during the automation, all of the downloaded files have the same basic file name with a number appended. (This is how Android handles downloading a file with a duplicate name.) Consider the same attack, but the file names are randomized. In this case, these files will be interleaved with the user's legitimate files in the drive. Deleting the files from the attack without accidentally deleting legitimate data might become quite delicate work. In this way, the attack could indirectly lead to more data loss on the user's phone.
Another significant expansion of the attack would be to replace the dummy files used with a malicious URI. Figure 21 shows Android's notification screen-the user can clear the list of downloaded files by clicking the icon outlined in red. While clearing a large number of notifications in Android, it is easy to accidentally click an .apk on the file list. If this .apk contains Android malware, the user might be tricked into installing an .apk that, say, promises to prevent this sort of attack in the future. This basic social engineering could leverage our resource exhaustion attack for an entirely different type of attack.
Finally, one interesting ramification of denial of service via NFC is the masking effect it has. To the server hosting the files used for the attack, the requests for URIs seem to come from the victim phone, despite the fact that they are generated by the attacking phone. The server has no way of knowing about the attacker's participation. This might provide a useful starting point for malicious behavior by an attacker.
Using automation for fuzz testing
In this section, we discuss the use of out automation framework for fuzz testing NFC. As in the denial of service attack in Sect. 4, the basic idea is to repeatedly send requests from the source phone to the destination phone. However, unlike in the DoS case, the test inputs must be carefully selected and the automation continues only until the input to be tested is exhausted.
Entities
As in DoS attack, the phones used in the development of the fuzz testing application are two Samsung Galaxy Nexus GSM/HSPA+ phones. In this section we will refer to them as the tester (source) phone and the testee (destination) phone.
The testee's purpose is to receive the fuzz testing input and handle it as a standard Android phone would. The testee is running stock Android Jellybean 4.3. It is important for the testee to run stock Android so that we can understand how the Android operating system handles NFC input by default. However, it would also be interesting to experiment with the testee that has a custom Android ROM or user-installed NFC applications running. Certainly this could be done using our automation framework. Our application will run as long as the NFC subsystem on the testee phone is standard.
One significant difference between the testee in fuzz testing versus the victim in denial of service is that we assume that we have physical access to the testee phone before, during, and after testing, and we have permission to install our own applications on the testee phone. This is necessary for discovering interesting events that occur on the testee phone as a result of our fuzz testing. To monitor the results of the testing on the testee phone, we provide a simple application that monitors the log output on the phone and copies any interesting events to a file stored on the phone's SD card.
The tester's purpose is to generate the test input and run the test by sending the inputs to the testee. The tester phone is running our automation framework as described in Sect. 3 and it is expected to be driven by human input at this time.
An optional third entity is a monitor computer running ADB. If a third computer is used, both phones can be connected to it via USB and monitored using ADB. This would be useful for more in-depth debugging of problematic inputs, but will not be considered in the remainder of this section.
Interactions
Before the test is started, the monitoring application must be started on the testee phone. Once the monitoring application has been started, the tester launches the test using our automation application. In most cases, the desired content source will be accessed a remote file. This remote file is assumed to contain previously-generated test inputs. We also provide the option to generate a random file for input. This will generate 1000 test inputs using generation based fuzzing, e.g., random, valid NDEFs. The tester selects the "max time" for fuzz testing. The test will then run until the end of the input is reached or a timeout occurs. The time limit ensures that if there is an unexplained hang, such as a catastrophic NFC subsystem crash, the test will not continue to idle indefinitely.
While the test runs, the tester gathers statistics about the run and the testee monitors for any interesting results. The testee is configured to capture any log output containing an exception, or the string NFC, or with a tag containing the string NFC. The first case ensures that exceptions will not be missed even if they are generated by applications NFC passes input to, while the latter two encompass all log messages generated by the NFC subsystem.
After testing, the logs on both the tester phone and the testee phone can be examined to draw conclusions about the results. It may be useful to examine the testee log manually. We have also written a script, testsummary.py, to summarize the results of the run from the testee's perspective.
Assumptions
To simplify matters, we assume that the tester and testee phones are physically touching and will not be moved during the test. As in Sect. 4, the test will continue to run even if the phones are moved and will resume if they are separated and put within range again. However, doing so may generate unexpected results that do not relate to the fuzzing input but rather the physical change in device position.
Beyond the proximity requirement, our assumptions are greatly relaxed for the fuzz testing as compared to the DoS attack. For example, the testee phone does not necessarily need to be running stock Jellybean. Of course, both phones still need to be NFC-capable and have NFC enabled.
Generating random inputs
Previous research suggests that some tools exist to generate random NDEFs as fuzz testing inputs, but none of these tools appears to be publicly available at this time. Therefore, we have provided a simple function within the automation framework for generating random NDEFs. It is based around the NDEF message format and results in the construction of an NdefMessage [2] .
The random inputs generated by the program are generated using a series of functions in the automation application. The essential idea is this: We form a dependency tree of the various fields in an NDEF record, then follow the tree from top to bottom-the NDEF fields are described in Table 1 in Sect. 1. First a random number is generated to ascertain the TNF of the NDEF to be generated. Then, depending on the TNF chosen, a Type field may need to be randomly selected. If a Type is selected, the corresponding Type Length is used for that field. Table 8 summarizes the TNF options, and Table 9 summarizes the types generated by our input generation script. Note that the types of NDEF records generated by our input generation script are a proper subset of all of the possible NDEF record combinations.
Both Message Begin (MB) and Message End (ME) are always set to 1 in our generation, as we only generate inputs containing one record per message. Similarly, the CF (Chunk Flag) flag is always set to 0 as Android does not use chunking for NFC.
Fuzz test implementation
When the source is specified as a remote URI, the file should be in a specific format. For the sake of brevity, we omit the file format: see the Appendix of the report [8] for details. If the content source is set to random, the application will call a script that generates 1000 random NDEF messages, then stores them in a file on the SD card, as discussed above in We conducted two experiments to test the capabilities of our framework with respect to fuzz testing.
1. Input generation: First, we tested the ability of the application to successful generate valid, random NDEF messages. To do this, we used the random file content option to generate 1000 random NDEFs. Then we monitored the logcat output on both the tester and testee phones for any unusual behavior that would indicate an incorrectly structured NDEF. 2. Fuzzing tests: After we had confirmed the validity of our NDEF generation code, we proceeded to generate a large number of inputs. We generated 1000 random NDEFs and monitored for errors. Our experiments in Sect. 4 indicated that about 40 NDEF messages can be sent per minute. Thus, it should be possible to run an entire set of 1000 fuzzing inputs in about 2 h.
Initial results
We were able to generate random NDEFs with our framework and did not encounter any exceptions on the tester side or the testee side except for UI complaints. On the tester phone, the UI thread would occasionally throw an exception indicating that the program was taking too long elsewhere; this is likely related to the amount of time needed to generate the random messages.
After we confirmed that we could create a set of messages without issue, we let the test run until the battery ran down (approximately 3 h) on the testee phone. During that time, the tester phone continuously sent randomly generated NDEFs to the testee phone. Both phones were able to tolerate the load without throwing any unusual exceptions.
Discussion
The work discussed in this section demonstrates that our automation framework provides a viable option for fuzz testing NFC. It provides an easy mechanism for testing large sets of NDEF messages. The NDEF messages can either be provided in a remote file or randomly generated during program execution. However, the current fuzzing generation feature of the framework is rudimentary and does not allow for nuanced testing. Improvements to this feature are in the realm of future work.
Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we presented a detailed description of a novel method of automating messages between two NFC-enabled cell phones. We then applied this framework to two separate problems. First, we used the framework to perform a denial of service attack against a cell phone, targeting both the battery on the phone and the internal storage on the phone. We were able to successfully drain the battery of the phone and consume its entire storage space. We also measured the impact of the attack over shorter time intervals to draw some conclusions about the potential for shorter, more practical DoS attacks.
Second, we used the framework as a means of performing basic fuzz testing for NFC. We showed how the same framework could be applied with different settings to achieve this end. We provided some rudimentary means of generating input for fuzz testing and showed that our scripts resulted in valid NDEF messages. We then showed how our system could be used for sending these messages and monitoring results on the destination phone.
This work shows that NFC automation is a viable, implementable technology. And, as with most security-related technology, there are positive use cases and negative use cases.
The NFC automation framework presented here is intended as a proof-of-concept. Consequently, there are many possible extensions of this work that are worthy of further research. At the top of this list are improvement to our NDEF fuzz testing input generator, further testing on wider variety of phones, and consideration of more sophisticated attacks that leveraging the capabilities of our framework.
Across existing NFC fuzz testing research, a recurring theme is the lack of a good solution for generating input to feed into NFC. We have provided a rudimentary system for generating random NDEF records. This system could certainly be expanded and improved. One significant potential improvement would be to add mutation based input generation along with the generation based input creation we have provided.
Implementing our automation framework to work on real hardware gave us many insights into the practicalities associated with developing for modern NFC. Using actual hardware exposes timing and synchronization issues masked by the emulator, and reveals physical characteristics that may complicate or prevent NFC transmission. We had limited access to NFC-capable Android phones for this project, but expect that our automation framework would work on any Android phones with NFC capabilities running JellyBean. Future work could include testing using other models of phones, including other vendors' implementations, for the source and destination phones.
In addition to fuzz testing, we showed that our framework can be used to perform DoS attacks. Another possible sinister use case would be to send commands from a malicious phone to a victim phone, which would then execute the command. For instance, the malicious phone could generate inputs to flood a particularly server with requests, then automate sending those inputs to a victim phone. The victim phone would then relay those messages to the server. From the server's perspective, the victim would seem to be the source of the attack. In this way, the transient nature of physical NFC contact might even be a boon (from the attacker's perspective), since the attacker could move from place to place, shunting his requests through whatever innocent phones he came across.
Another potential application for the existing framework would be to investigate denial of service via passive tags. For example, supposed the victim phone's user is could be convinced to install the automation framework-presumably, as a trojan. Once installed on the victim's phone, the automation application could be set to go into an infinite loop, i.e., it runs in "test until failure" mode. But rather than seeking to constantly send, as the automation framework does in our DoS attack, the victim phone could instead constantly advertise itself as a receiver. Should it come in contact with another device, or even a passive tag, it will get stuck in a cycle of attempting to read from that entity, and in doing so it would likely perform DoS attack on itself.
One assumption we made in our DoS work is that the attacker would have a means of assuring that the victim's phone screen would stay on. Recall that the screen must be on and unlocked for NFC transactions to occur. One significant improvement to the implemented attack would be to add the ability to trigger the victim's screen to stay awake. Previous research [23] has provided a method for unlocking the screen of a victim phone using a dialer and the victim phone's number. It should be possible to implement such a method within our application.
The NDEFs transmitted could to the victim phone could contain URIs to sites containing malicious, illegal, or unsettling content. The impact of this sort of attack is more difficult to quantify than a battery exhaustion attack. But such an attack could have a real-world impact in certain scenarios, in part due to the potential for a misleading audit trail in NFC. For example, consider the following scenario: An attacker gains brief physical access to a smartphone belonging to a public official. The attacker than uses our NFC framework to direct the official's phone to sites containing inappropriate content. There would be evidence on the server side that the official accessed this material, but no trail back to the attacker.
It might prove interesting to consider combining NFC with scripting-based browser attacks. It might be possible to use NDEFs to pass URIs that post to web forms. The attacker would need to identify a webform suitable for the attack, i.e., one that passes the data for the form in a query string that can be spoofed. Then, assuming the attacker knows the identity of the victim, the attacker can pass in parameters to the web form to post inflammatory comments that, by all accounts, appear to be from the victim.
Our experiments investigated the functional operation range of NFC and showed that until the transmission limit is reached, approximately the same number of messages can be sent in a given time period at any distance. It would be worth examining whether the distance between the devices during operation impacts the battery drain on the victim phone during the attack.
Another variable that could be easily tested is the time between NFC resets. We checked for the need to reset every 5 s and this value seemed to work well. The number of resets tended to be very low compared to the number of messages successfully sent over any given interval, implying that there were rarely unnecessary resets. But perhaps 5 s is too frequent, and the same issues could be prevented by checking every 10 or 20 s. There is some overhead associated with checking for the need to reset, so the number of messages successfully sent over an interval might increase if there was less frequent reset checking.
Finally, we should consider a means of preventing the denial of service as performed in this paper. One of the key components of this attack is the behavior of the default Android browser. It could be modified to drastically reduce the efficacy of this attack. For instance, it could be altered to only allow a certain number of files with the same name to be downloaded. Or, it could be altered to only allow a certain number of outstanding download requests. Certainly it could be changed to allow users to cancel their outstanding downloads simultaneously which, regardless of the attacks considered here, would improve the usability of the device.
